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Purpose: Using System Dynamics approach together with Lanchester and SIR models for 
modeling information war. Theoretical considerations. 
Approach: Due to the theoretical form of conducted research the main research methodso 
were a literature review and simulations based on developed model. 
Conclusions: The result of the research is the model of information war based on System 
Dynamics approach. The model focuses on how socjety wealth and counterdisinformation 
campaings affect on war efficiency. One of the key conclusion from the simulations results is 
that one of the main goals of attacking side should be elimination or taking control over 
public media of attacked one.  
Practical implications: The model of information war which was developed during the 
researche, gives a possibility to get new knowledge about war information procesess. It 
allows to predict causes and effects of disinformation campaings and helps to make proper 
decisions connected with  countermeasuers that are taken. Presented article appoints 
directions which needs to be explored in connection with information wars. 
Orginality: Presented researches are pioneerign and in such form on this field was not 
conducted so far. Using Lanchester equations, connected with epidemic spread model and 
System Dynamics approach they provide new knowledge about the phenomenon of 
information war. 
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Information is playing an increasingly important role in the modern world. Its value 
increases proportionally to its level of strategic importance for companies and 
organizations as well as for governments, countries, and alliances. Moreover, in 
societies and economies based on knowledge, information becomes the basis of their 
functioning. As Krzysztof Liderman claims, “The basis for the operation of almost 
all modern companies and organizations, including organizations responsible for the 
functioning of the state itself, is the appropriate circulation of information. 
Interrupting this circulation or falsifying information causes losses: for companies 
this process may end in bankruptcy, and for the state - social unrest, disturbances in 
the national economy, and a decline in its reputation in the international forum” 
(Liderman, 2017). 
 
The intensive development of technologies not only brings about essentially 
unlimited possibilities for information exchange but it also facilitates the emergence 
of new threats, including information and economic wars, which may bring about 
the massive destabilization of countries. 
 
It was noted at the end of the previous century that modern society may be thought 
of as an information society. However, when this term was coined it was somewhat 
related to quick access to business information which presented certain organizations 
an advantage over their competitors. Through an observation of our present, it may 
be concluded that the term information society should be far more widely applied 
than it was in the recent past. The word information is for the most part associated 
with the worldwide web, especially social portals, television channels, and other 
kinds of electronic media.  
 
The report published by the We are social agency and the Hootsuite platform shows 
the massive development of digital technologies, in particular social media (Table 
1). The number of internet users around the world has increased by 400 million 
people compared to this time last year, this figure represents an annual growth of 10 
percent which gives us an average rate of more than 1 million new users each day. A 
similar trend may be seen in social media, especially in the context of the users of 
mobile devices (Table 2). 
 











7.734 bilion 5.155 bilion 4.479 bilion 3.725 bilion 3.660 bilion 
Source: https://wearesocial.com/blog/2019/10/the-global-state-of-digital-in-October-2019. 
 
The numbers presented in Table 1 and Table 2 clearly show that the Internet can be 
an attractive space for anyone who wishes to influence people to change their 
behaviour or thinking. 
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+1.0% +2.4% +10% +9.6% +15% 
+79 milion +123 milion +416 milion +328 milion +476 milion 
Source: https://wearesocial.com/blog/2019/10/the-global-state-of-digital-in-October-2019. 
 
Although information cannot cause direct physical harm to either human or non-
human beings or any other material things, during the last decade it has become a 
real weapon which has given rise to a wide range of possibilities. It has also turned 
out that the Internet is an excellent environment in which the conditions for the rapid 
dissemination of crafted content (their broadcasting around the world, duplication, 
editing out undesirable content, imposing one’s own interpretation) have been 
created (Darczewska and Żochowski, 2017). It is important to note that by 
implementing the process above, one can remain anonymous and reach recipients 
directly, in real-time, bypassing all communication and information barriers and 
intermediaries in the transmission of content. This situation has been acknowledged 
by many countries that have recognized cyberspace as the fifth dimension of 
warfare. 
 
2. Examples of Contemporary Information Wars 
 
Offensive disinformation activities have long been one of the most important tools in 
the arsenal of active measures used by the Russian Federation, and even earlier by 
the Soviet Union (Szpyra, 2020). The main goal of these activities is to direct a 
particular opponent to implement the activities desired by Moscow. Given Russia's 
experiences outlined above, it may be assumed that their authorities are experts in 
the art of spreading disinformation in the online environment. 
 
It is noteworthy that the Russians have formed military units with the sole purpose 
of conducting ‘information operations’, this was reported in February 2017 by the 
Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation - Sergei Szojgu. “Forces for 
information operations have been created, which are far more useful than what we 
previously designed and developed, and what was called counter-propaganda - said 
the minister, referring to the Soviet era. Propaganda should be intelligent, competent 
and effective - he added” (Wprost, 2020). 
 
As J. Darczewska claims “[…] most Russian authors understand “information 
warfare” as the process of influencing the consciousness of the masses as a part of 
the rivalry between the different civilizational systems adopted by different countries 
in the information arena through the use of special means to control information 
resources as “information weapons” (Darczewska, 2014). Information war is a long-
term and multidirectional process that uses many different attack vectors and impact 
areas. As Professor Igor Panarin notes (Panarin, 2012), the typical methods of 
information warfare include: 
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− Social control – influencing society. 
− Social manoeuvring – the intentional control of the public aimed at gaining 
certain benefits. 
− Information manipulation – using authentic information in a way that gives 
rise to false implications. 
− Disinformation – spreading manipulated or fabricated information or a 
combination thereof. 
− Fabrication of information – creating false information. 
− Lobbying – influence by spokespersons in the interest of various political or 
economic groups 
− Blackmail – the threat of revealing or publicizing either substantially true or 
false information about a person or people unless certain demands are met. 
− Extortion of desired information - forcing entities to distribute specific 
information. 
 
Russia runs disinformation campaigns using both the Internet (e.g. social media) and 
traditional media. These campaigns typically gain momentum especially during 
critical events such as elections, referendums or social conflicts. The presidential 
elections of the United States (Stobiecki and Kuczabski, 2020) or the protests of the 
‘yellow vests’ in France may serve as examples of these activities (Wałęcki, 2020). 
Moreover, many of these campaigns are carried out by the citizens of the countries 
concerned, who are often unaware that the information they share comes from 
Russian sources. ‘If the “toxic meme” is addressed to the appropriate recipient, they 
might disseminate it freely. These memes particularly appeal to Internet users who 
already feel marginalized and disempowered’ (Cepa, 2019). It should be noted that 
Russian information war is based on three essential elements: traditional media, 
social media and the Internet, and also on supportive action, i.e. intensive 
cooperation with radical organizations or with fringe left-wing and right-wing 
political parties which share the Russian point of view. By using local actors as 
disseminators, Moscow considers that the content is more likely to be understood 
and shared. The phenomenon known as echo chambers is used here, these can 
amplify and reinforce disinformation and moreover, they make the Kremlin’s 
activities more difficult to track down. 
 
Another example of using prepared information campaigns to influence the public 
was observed during the Ukrainian crisis especially after the annexation of Crimea 
in 2014 by Russia or the events at Independence Square in Kyiv from November 
2013 to February 2014. Although the Ukraine crisis first drew Western attention to 
the significance of Russia’s information campaign, the Kremlin’s use of 
disinformation long predates that crisis. Russian techniques have been growing in 
sophistication, intensity, reach and impact. Russian efforts are carefully orchestrated, 
thoughtfully targeted, generously funded and professionally produced (Cepa, 2014). 
Russians use fake social media accounts that simulate genuine ones to spread chaos 
by trolling the intended messages of other users by making fun of them or directing 
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insults at them and also bots are used which have the function of emulating human 
behaviour automatically. At the NATO summit in Wales in August 2014, General 
Philip Breedlove, the Supreme Allied Commander for NATO in Europe said that 
Russia was waging ‘the most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever 
seen in the history of information warfare’ (Theatlantic, 2014). 
 
A characteristic feature of Russian disinformation campaigns directed against 
Ukraine is their ability to adapt their message depending on the audience. One 
message will be directed at Western Europe (people in the east of Ukraine fighting 
for their independence) and another at Ukrainian citizens (encouraging anti-US and 
anti-EU sentiment) and still another at Russian citizens (connecting Ukrainian 
nationalism and German fascism). In order to make this content appealing, Russia is 
prepared to fabricate stories entirely, using photos and video footage to suit Russia’s 
needs. A full range of media, from cinema to news, talk shows, print and social 
media are engaged in promoting official Russian narratives (Cepa, 2014). Hence, RT 
television broadcasts information about the celebration of holidays, organizes 
cultural events, or even presents recordings from the first marriage concluded in 
Novorossia.  
 
On the other hand, the events in Kiev's Maidan were presented as a ‘revolt against 
the authorities’, ‘coup’, or the ‘actions of a radical group’ (Lakomy, 2014). As the 
authors of the study “Active measures. A Russian export commodity” (Darczewska 
and Żochowski, 2017) claims: “The effectiveness of the impact of the operations 
depends on the diagnosis of the balance of power, the political situation, but also on 
the prevailing political culture and the state of the social needs of the population. 
Such a diagnosis is based on the social engineering techniques used by the Russian 
services to oppose the elites and the wider society of the target country”. 
 
There is no doubt that the Internet has become a battlefield for the human perception 
of reality. We should build models to research in a more profound way how 
disinformation can be used to penetrate different echo chambers, how to identify 
bogus accounts in social media or measure the impact of bots and trolls on the 
opinions of the general public (Świeboda, 2019). 
 
3. Basic Concepts of Information War Modelling 
 
Modelling information warfare and predicting its behaviour will always be a 
challenging task due to the high degree of dynamics in such operations and the 
dozens of parameters that should be considered, this applies not only to field 
commanders but also to modellers. The main characteristic feature of war operations 
is that at least two opposing sides are engaged in them and each one significantly 
impacts the decisions and behaviour of the other side. In modelling, such a mutual 
influence is called feedback. This means that changing the state of object A has an 
influence on the state of object B, which is somehow connected with A, and in turn 
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the state of B can cause further changes to occur in the state of object A. Such an 
example of mutual influence is presented in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Mutual influence of objects A and B. A affects B and B affects A.  
 
Source: Own study. 
 
The theory of feedback loops has also been widely considered in control theory, 
which was developed over the decades by such great scientists as Euler, Lagrange, 
Laplace or Lyapunov. Each of them also made a significant contribution to the 
development of mathematical methods designed for dynamic systems modelling, 
called calculus.  
 
Over the centuries, calculus methods have been widely used in mechanics because 
such systems stand out with their high degree of dynamics and many sources of 
feedback. That is one of the reasons why the first models of warfare were developed 
in 1916 by English car engineer Frederick Lanchester. He defined battle in the form 
of ordinary differential equations in two ways (Lanchester, 1916): 
 
1. The first one, also known as the aimed fire model, assumes that each unit 
destroys enemy units in one unit time.  
2. The second one assumes that both sides fire directly into the operating area 
(like artillery fire or bombardment) which is more appropriate to modern 
operations. 
 
To date, the Lanchester models have been the subject of many  research efforts, 
therefore the overall concept is a solid base for building information war models 
which are described later in the article. In contrast to traditional military operations 
which were carried out and then studied by researchers over centuries, information 
operations differ in many aspects. First of all, such a means of combat as 
information is characterized by: 
 
1. It is abstract, unlike traditional weapons it has no physical effect.  
2. Information does not have a direct physical impact on the enemy and cannot 
cause physical injuries. 
3. Information may be used as many times as necessary. 
4.  It may have a delayed trigger. 
5.  In recent years, a situation has developed where all sorts of information may  
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 be produced and published at a very low cost. 
6. It has a very wide, even in the geographical sense, impact factor. 
7. Information changes people’s way of thinking and in the aftermath it 
changes their behaviour. 
 
Due to the description listed above, it may be concluded without too much further 
consideration that for modelling information operations, the traditional Lanchester 
model is not sufficient. The main reasons for this are described in the following 
points above: 2, 4, 7 which generally state that information does not behave like 
traditional ammunition but rather, it has more of an influence on people’s minds than 
on their physicality (e.g. injuries). An individual who is ‘hit’ by a piece of 
information will begin to process it (even unconsciously) depending on some 
external factors such as: 
 
- Level of education 
- Financial security 
- Other information surrounding them 
 
Then the person will take the final decision as to whether or not to believe the 
information. To put it in basic terms, the person is changing their state of mind from 
undecided – at the moment when they were “hit” by the information, to aware – the 
moment of consciously taking the decision. Such a transition from one way of 
thinking to another is well known and frequently used in the modelling of marketing 
campaigns.  
 
Quite similar changes in the mindsets of people were defined by Kermack and 
McKendrick (1927) in their epidemic spread models. It is also worth emphasizing 
that the first concepts of mathematical modelling of infectious diseases were 
initiated by Bernoulli (1760). Kermack and McKendrick defined two models which 
are still used: 
 
- SI from: Susceptible – Infected; 
- SIR from: Susceptible – Infected – Recovered; 
where: 
- Susceptible individuals are uninfected but susceptible to the disease; 
- Infected individuals can infect other susceptible individuals; 
- Recovered individuals have recovered from the infection and are immune to 
reinfection. 
 
Both of these models track the number of susceptible and infected individuals during 
the epidemic with the help of ordinary differential equations (ODE), while the SIR 
model additionally tracks the number of recovered ones.  
 
While analysing changes to the individual’s health status in the SIR model − from 
susceptible, through to infected to recovered − similarities to changes in decisions 
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states could be observed. A susceptible state corresponds to undecided, infected to 
influenced by the relevant piece of information, and recovered to taking a conscious 
decision about the information received. Due to the similarities observed, for 
information warfare modelling, the authors of the article combined two concepts:  
 
- Lanchester war model; 
- SIR epidemic spread model. 
 
Because each of them, due to representing a highly dynamic system, is written in the 
form of ODE, such a combination would require considerable mathematical effort. 
To avoid complex mathematical calculations, the authors propose the use of System 
Dynamics which was introduced by Jay Forrester in the 1960s (Forrester, 1961). The 
key concepts of System Dynamics are: 
 
- Finding relationships between key elements of the modelled dynamics 
system and discovering feedback loops. 
- Representing the modelled system in the form of stock and flow diagrams 
instead of mathematical formulas. 
- Machine transformation of stocks and flows diagrams into ODE and solving 
them through the use of numerical procedures. 
 
An example of a feedback loop is presented in Figure 4, and the basic stock and flow 
diagram with its corresponding mathematical formula is presented in Figure 2. 
 




Source: Own study. 
 
The System Dynamics approach which, due to its graphical representation, is much 
more straightforward to understand for modellers than raw mathematical formulas 
has become very popular in recent decades especially for modeling economic, 
environmental, social or other non-deterministic systems including war operations. 
Using the System Dynamics approach, feedback loops of Lanchester linear law are 
presented in Figure 3 and in the stock and flow diagram in Figure 4.  
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Figure 3. Causal loop diagram of the Lanchester linear law. 
 
Source: Own study. 
 
Figure 4. Stock and flow diagram of the Lanchester linear law. 
 
Source: Own study. 
 
A simplified causal loop and a stock and flow diagram of a SIR model are presented 
in Figures 5 and 6 respectively. 
 
Figure 5. Simplified causal loop diagram of a SIR model. 
 
Source: Own study. 
 
Figure 6. Stock and flow diagram of a SIR epidemic model. 
 
 Source: Own study. 
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4. Information War Basic Model 
 
Having chosen the basic concepts and methodology for information war, the 
modelling authors of the article have identified the key elements of information war 
and have proposed its causal loop diagram which is presented in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. Causal loop diagram of an information war model. 
 
Source: Own study. 
 
The authors assumed that information operations are carried out by two opposing 
sides with one referred to as Red, which is the attacking side and Blue, which 
defends its citizens from the influence of Reds. 
 
The triggering element of the information war is a disinformation campaign started 
by the Red side. They start to publish in the available medias different kinds of 
information which are read and subscribed to by Blue society. If Red’s information 
campaign is attractive enough the number of subscribers will increase and finally, 
more individuals will become affected and influenced by the Red side. 
 
When the Blue side’s administration discovers the Red disinformation campaign, 
they  commence anti-disinformation operations. Such operations to encourage new 
subscribers must be at least as attractive as those carried out by the Red side. 
 
Because Blue’s administration dismisses information published by Reds or shows an 
alternative point of view of reality, individuals who were firstly influenced by Red 
propaganda start to think the matter over and depending on their material, 
educational and general wealth status, they become more aware of their surrounding 
reality and change their decisions. They also become more critical of Red’s 
information and more trusting of the Blue point of view.  
 
A stocks and flow diagram of the model described above is presented in Figure 8. It 
includes 10 stocks which means that 10 sets of ODEs are described.   
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Figure 8. Stock and flow diagram of an information war model. 
 
Source: Own study. 
 
5. Simulation Results 
 
Having created the model presented in Figure 8, the authors were able to run 
simulation experiments and go through different scenarios of information wars. As a 
numerical procedure, due to its speed and simplicity, the 4th-order Runge-Kutta was 
chosen. The authors made four experiments with different values of two variables:  
 
• “Wealth factor”  − which represents the status of individuals and is an average of 
their educational and wealth level, political, social and cultural maturity. The 
higher the “Wealth factor” is, the higher the average status of citizens in general 
and also the more developed the society 
• “Blue campaign intensity” – shows the intensity of the information campaign 
carried out by the Blue (defending) side. A low value for this factor means that 
the Blue side has low resources and possibilities to counteract Red’s propaganda. 
If the value of this factor is ‘0’, it means that Blue’s mass media are excluded 
from the information war (e.g. destroyed) or are totally in Red’s hands. 
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In the first scenario, the authors assumed that the “Wealth factor” and ‘Blue 
campaign intensity’ are ‘0’. This means that the society is poor (Figure 9) with a low 
education level and low social and cultural awareness. There is also no anti-
propaganda actions taken by the Blue side. As a consequence, individuals only 
receive information sent by the Red side and they do not have a broader perspective 
concerning the surrounding world. As a consequence, after some period of time all 
individuals become influenced by Reds, this is presented in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 9. The number of poor (green line) and wealthy individuals (red line). 
Source: own study.  
 
Source: Own study. 
 
Figure 10. The number of undecided individuals (green line), those influenced by 
Reds (blue line) and aware (red line). 
 
Source: Own study. 
 
In the second scenario, the “Wealth factor” was increased to 0.3 and the “Blue 
campaign intensity” was held at level “0”. As a consequence, the number of wealthy 
individuals started to grow linearly but because of a lack of anti-propaganda 
information society became influenced by Reds which is – with minor differences – 
similar to the first experiment. The results of this scenario are presented in Figures 
11 and 12.  
 
During the third, and last experiment, the authors left the value of the ‘Wealth 
factor’ at a level of 0.3 but in contrast to the previous simulation the value of the 
‘Blue campaign intensity’ was increased to 10. This means that society is slowly 
developing and that the Blues have sufficient resources to counteract Red’s 
propaganda. The results of this experiment are presented in Figures 13 and 14. The 
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last diagram shows that after some period of time the numbers influenced by Red’s 
information begins to decrease and the number of aware individuals who agree with 
the Blue side starts to grow. In a practical sense, this means that the people who were 
given an alternative source of information received a broader perspective of reality 
and considered the information received with some degree of criticism which makes 
their decision more informed. 
 
Figure 11. The number of poor (green line) and wealthy individuals (red line). 
 
Source: Own study. 
 
Figure 12. The number of undecided individuals ((green line), those influenced by 
Reds (blue line) and aware (red line). 
 
Source: Own study. 
 
Figure 13. The number of poor (green line) and wealthy individuals (red line). 
Source: own study. 
 
Source: Own study. 
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Figure 14. The number of undecided individuals (green line), those influenced by 
Reds (blue line) and aware (red line). 
 
Source: Own study. 
 
6. Conclusions  
 
Generally speaking, war is a complicated subject to model in a formal sense due to 
the large number of parameters that are described, and by the dynamic changes of 
these parameters. Both now and in the past, many techniques have been used to 
model war operations, for example, probability theory, expert appraisal theory, 
Markov chains (Novikov, 2013) but the most famous and widespread one is the 
Lanchester model, which employs ODE used to model dynamical systems. With the 
development of computing technology the simulation methods approach based on 
differential equations became popular due to its increasing efficiency.  
 
Information operations are a special kind of war operation because information is 
abstract and has no real identity. Because information affects the individual’s mind 
rather than their body, it is difficult to model their impact. During their research, the 
authors discovered similarities between the spread of an epidemic and changes to the 
state of mind of individuals affected by the information campaign, they tried to adapt 
the epidemic model to the information war model. In order to avoid the deep 
mathematical analysis related to differential equations, which are the foundations of 
both the war and epidemic spread models, System Dynamics techniques were 
employed. Three different approaches were connected: 
 
• Lanchester’s model. 
• Epidemic spread model. 
• System Dynamics methodology. 
 
The authors successfully built a basic model of information war and obtained 
satisfactory results, which revealed two key factors affecting information war 
efficiency: the wealth of the general society and anti-propaganda campaigns. In 
cases where the society is relatively poor, which means that in general the people are 
probably poorly educated and have a low level of political awareness, the resources 
for counteracting disinformation are not sufficient and as a result, propaganda 
activities become very efficient.  
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Based on the simulation results, it may be concluded that from the point of view of 
the attacking side, in order to eliminate anti-propaganda campaigns, it is well worth 
making an effort to seize control over the mass media of the target country. The 
destabilization of the economy could also be a worthwhile objective because 
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